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Comments on McMillan and Woodruff's
'Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order'
Ellen D. Katz*
In Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order,1 John
McMilan and Christopher Woodruff describe the private institutions
that order commercial transactions in developing economies where
commercial actors view the formal legal regime as unreliable. Pre-
senting evidence from surveys of market participants in several
Eastern European countries and in Vietnam, McMillan and Woodruff
depict a system of private order that requires formal organization and
the creation of institutions to share information and coordinate multi-
party responses. These institutions do not simply offer a viable alter-
native to public procedures, but also enable commercial transactions
to occur where the vacuum in public order would otherwise preclude
valuable trades. In conclusion, however, the authors allude to the re-
liance of some private-order institutions on practices of exclusion,
collusion, and physical violence that yield economic inefficiencies.
This "downside" to private order, they assert, means that while private
order in developing economies "can usefully supplement public law,
[it] cannot replace it."'
This assertion is correct but incomplete. McMillan and Woodruff
rightly note that private order is not a substitute for public govern-
ance, and that public-order institutions are needed to facilitate inter-
nalization of the negative externalities that private order produces.
But public order serves a much broader and deeper function. Demo-
cratic public-order institutions, when accompanied by public-order
norms of transparency and accountability, offer processes and policies
of greater legitimacy and fairness than can private-order institutions.
While the goal of the public realm ought not be to supplant private-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1991, J.D. 1994,
Yale. - Ed. Thanks to Omri Ben-Shahar and Ronald Mann for helpful comments and dis-
cussions. Benjamin Mizer provided able research assistance.
1. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public
Order, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 2421 (2000).
2. Id. at 2423.
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order decisionmaking, the inclusiveness of democratic decisionmaking
ultimately means that public order should be seen as the preferable
form of governance, even if public order does nothing more than ratify
the existing private-order system.
These comments will discuss the difficulty in structuring public in-
stitutions in a developing economy where a vibrant, though perhaps
problematic, system of private order operates, and will address the
role of public order more generally as a source of legitimacy for gov-
ernance of any kind.
I. THE DOWNSIDE OF PRIVATE ORDER
A substantial literature celebrates the benefits of private order.3
Private order often provides greater efficiency and involves lower
transaction costs than do public-order regimes. Many believe it
achieves better results; that is, participants in the private-order regime
view outcomes arising thereunder as preferable to those that might be
produced by public-order mechanisms. Private-order institutions are
often well-situated to monitor market conduct, and their decisionmak-
ers remain close to and thus well-informed about industry practice.
Private-order adjudicatory practices accordingly may produce more
nuanced decisions than do public-order ones, particularly given the
former's broader freedom to consider evidence that would generally
be inadmissible in traditional law courts.4
The very features of private order that have prompted so much
celebration may also explain the problematic facets of private order
that scholars have increasingly identified.5 Private-order institutions
3. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETrLE DISPUTES 280-83 (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Re-
thinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 L LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]; Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton
Industry: Value Creation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forth-
coming June 2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law]; David Charny, Nonle-
gal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990); Stephen Choi,
Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 920-21 (1998); Robert C. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 YALE LJ. 1315, 1320-21 (1993); Ronald J. Mann, Verification Instru-
ments in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225,2227-28 (1999).
4. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 3, at 126-27; Charny, supra note 3, at 415-16;
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2425.
5. See, e.g., Serguey Braguinsky, Enforcement of Property Rights During the Russian
Transition: Problems and Some Approaches to a New Liberal Solution, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
515, 519-20 (1999); Kathryn Hendley et al., Observations on the Use of Law by Russian En-
terprises, 13 POST-SOvIET AFF. 19,39 (1997); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark
Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U.
Cmu. L. REV. 41, 43-44, 92-95 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1711-25 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 961 (1996).
2482 [Vol. 98:2481
Private Order and Public Institutions
may rely on exclusionary entry barriers, which may be grounded on
race, gender, ethnicity, or other characteristics; coordination among
firms, which may yield collusive anticompetitive practices such as
price-fixing; and graduated forms of coordinated sanctions, which may
include physical violence and other forms of criminal activity.6
Some of these so-called "downside" practices are evident, perhaps
unsurprisingly, in the celebrated strategies used by various communi-
ties to prevent overuse of commonly held resources. Numerous stud-
ies challenge the notion that the tragedy of the commons is inevitable
by identifying mechanisms through which communal resources can be
managed in a sustainable manner.7 Most notably, a successful com-
mons generally does not provide open access, and thus is not really a
commons at all, for sustainable management typically requires some
mechanism to limit access to prevent overexploitation of the so-called
communal resource! Whether entry depends on membership in a so-
cial or ethnic group, or on other considerations, participation becomes
notably and necessarily exclusive rather than inclusive. While norms
of exclusion may yield benefits for the community and even for the
environment,9 their particular instantiation may rest on irrational or
otherwise objectionable discriminatory factors.
Communities managing a shared resource may also rely on an es-
calating series of sanctions to penalize participants and outsiders who
breach management norms." Penalties progress from gossip to van-
dalism to other forms of violence, raising concerns regarding account-
ability and public order generally, and calling into question the pur-
ported efficiency of private-order norms governing punishment.
6. See, e.g., JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988); Braguinsky,
supra note 5, at 519-22; Cheryl W. Gray, Reforming Legal Systems in Developing and Tran-
sition Countries, FIN. & DEv., Sept. 1997, at 14; Hendley et al., supra note 5, at 19; McMillan
& Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2456; Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 51-62.
7. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990), and THE QUESTION
OF THE COMMONS (Bonnie J. McCoy & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (collecting such
studies). See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(arguing that resources in an unregulated open access commons will be depleted). But see
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 37 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354-57
(1967) (arguing that private property will replace communal management of resources).
8. See ACHESON, supra note 6, at 48-49 (discussing practices of lobster fishermen in
Maine); RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL 72-106 (1995) (discussing the role of norms of
exclusion in defining group membership); OSTROM, supra note 7, at 58-102 (evaluating
common-pool resource management in divergent communities worldwide); THE QUESTION
OF THE COMMONS, supra note 7 (providing evaluative examples of common-pool resource
management in divergent communities worldwide); Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller,
The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2000) (discussing entry issues).
9. But see ACHESON, supra note 6, at 143-44 (noting depletion in resource despite en-
forcement of entry barriers); Robert Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth Maximizing Norms:
Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 83, 95-96 (1989).
10. See, e.g., ACHESON, supra note 6, at 73-76; ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 215-19;
OSTROM, supra note 7, at 15-19; see also WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND
PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 77-109,179-220 (1990).
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Poorly structured public-order institutions may explain why less
than optimal private-order practices evolve." As Curtis Milhaupt and
Mark West note, governmental failure "to get the [public] institutions
'right'" not only increases the costs for private actors seeking to util-
ize state procedures, but also contributes to what they term "dark-side
public ordering."12 Poorly structured legal institutions provide fertile
ground for thriving criminal organizations that promise to provide and
protect property rights more effectively than does the state. Just as an
existing system of private order can dampen the incentive of public of-
ficials to create and nurture valuable legal institutions, badly designed
legal institutions can inhibit vibrant private order and cause it to pro-
duce negative externalities. 3
Milhaupt and West, for example, demonstrate the link between
various modes of organized criminal conduct in Japan and specific de-
ficiencies in Japanese public-order institutions. They point to the sig-
nificant holdout problems resulting from the virtual life estate
Japanese law grants tenants, under which eviction becomes virtually
impossible in practice. This has given rise to the jiageya, or "land fix-
ers," a class of private individuals employed by real estate developers
and tenants alike to make threatening telephone calls, to organize dis-
ruptive activities, and otherwise to use physical violence to prompt
evictions and resolve disputes. 4
Where public-order institutions are inadequate or even wholly ab-
sent, participants in unregulated private-order institutions may find
that refraining from downside practices simply constitutes bad busi-
ness. Absent a state-imposed penalty or other type of sanction, fixing
prices or limiting participation to a restricted group may well present
11. See Hendley et al., supra note 5, at 39; Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 45, 92-95;
see also DIEGO GAMBEirA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF PRIVATE
PROTECTION (1993); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 101-103 (1990) (comparing consequences of differing institu-
tional heritages in North and Latin America); Bernard Black et al., Corporate Law from
Scratch, in 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA 245, 255
(Roman Frydman et al. eds., 1996) (explaining that, in the face of weak state enforcement,
Russian enterprise managers must lie on their tax reports, bribe state officials, pay off the
mafia, and engage in other corrupt practices simply to stay in business); Keith S. Rosenn,
Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, 1 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 22-23 (1984) (describing the
poor fit between Brazilian culture and governing law).
12. Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 45; see also JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A
STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED
(1998) (describing failures of state planning).
13. Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 43-44; see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of
the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621,
623-25 (1998); Mann, supra note 3, at 2228-29, 2272. Inadequate or otherwise problematic
public policies need not, of course, promote private order's "dark side," and instead may
simply prompt effective private-order institutions to develop. See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant
Law, supra note 3, at 1770-71.
14. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 68-69.
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the most rational and efficient course of action, at least from the per-
spective of institutional members. This is not, of course, to say that all
problematic facets of private order stem from purely rational behav-
ior. Less than optimal private-order norms may result from informa-
tion lags, changing technologies, moral considerations, cognitive bi-
ases, and even envy." But whether rational or not, private downside
practices persist where neither the private institutions nor their mem-
bers bear the immediate costs of the practices employed, and, even if
long-term efficiency suffers, the individual benefits reaped outweigh
(again from the individual's or individual institution's perspective) any
aggregate loss in overall welfare. Consequently, private-order institu-
tions will continue to engage in these practices absent a mechanism, be
it public or private, to force internalization of the negative external-
ities produced.'6
II. FIXING AND FACILITATING PRIVATE ORDER
Private order's downside leads McMillan and Woodruff rightly to
conclude that "[w]e thus need public order to limit these abuses of
private order."' How best to structure public-order institutions to ac-
complish this purpose is hardly self-evident, but three rudimentary
principles should guide the effort.
A. Developing vs. Developed Economies
Private-order institutions exist in both developing and highly de-
veloped economies.18 In one sense, private order responds to a similar
problem in both societies, namely a dissatisfaction with the existing
public order as a mechanism to govern private relationships and to re-
solve disputes. Whether that dissatisfaction arises from a vacuum in
the public realm, or from disagreement with or distaste for the sub-
stantive content of public law and the procedures that implement it, it
finds expression in the creation of a system of private rules thought
better to serve the interests of those adhering to them than do those in
the public arena.
15. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 1471 (1998) (discussing cognitive biases); Posner, supra note 5, at 1712-23; cf
MILLER, supra note 10, at 29-32; Carol Rose, Property As Storytelling: Perspectives from
Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990) (chal-
lenging rational-actor model).
16. See, e.g., Black, supra note 11, at 247; Braguinsky, supra note 5, at 517; Posner, supra
note 5, at 1711-25.
17. McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2458.
18. See, e.g., Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 3; McMillan & Woodruff,
supra note 1, at 2432,2438.
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But while the origins may be similar, at least when broadly de-
fined, the systems of private order in developing and developed
economies may require wholly distinct responses from the public sec-
tors. Seemingly successful public norms and programs from industrial
or developed economies may be ill-adapted to the complex issues con-
fronting less developed ones." For example, a developing economy
may be characterized by a lack of experience with and commitment to
competitive markets, the prevalence of bribery and acceptance of
bribery as a means of doing business and transacting with public offi-
cials, and a history of opaque decisionmaking and adjudicatory proc-
esses.
20
In such a climate, a public prohibition on price-fixing with an ac-
companying private right of action in court might have little impact on
anticompetitive private-order practices. Those injured by private-
order collusion justifiably may lack confidence in public-order institu-
tions to provide redress given that opaque decisionmaking and corrup-
tion have previously been the dominant characteristics of public dis-
pute resolution.21 Public institutions, moreover, may lack personnel
with sufficient experience with competitive markets to implement a
ban on price-fixing or more open-ended public norms. Indeed, inex-
perienced or ill-trained public officials can make matters worse.' And
the absence of necessary supportive institutions, the class Milhaupt
and West call "rights enforcement agents," can further hinder en-
forcement of public norms; accountants, appraisers, credit rating serv-
ices, the private bar, and the press reduce uncertainty by bridging re-
putational and informational gaps among parties to commercial
19. See NORTH, supra note 11, at 101 (describing failed adoption of U.S. and European
law in Latin America); ScoTr, supra note 12 (noting problematic transfer of agricultural
programs developed in western nations to less temperate regions, particularly in Africa);
Black et al., supra note 11, at 245; Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate
Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000); Gray, supra note 6,
at 15; Rosenn, supra note 11, at 22-23 (laws transplanted in Brazil not tailored to Brazilian
culture, producing gap between law and practice).
20. See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 11, at 67; Black et al., supra note 11, at 247; Black et al.,
supra note 19; Braguinsky, supra note 5, at 519-20; Gray, supra note 6, at 14; Hendley et al.,
supra note 5, at 22; see also Donatella della Porta & Alberto Vannucci, The 'Perverse Effects'
of Political Corruption, 45 POL. STUD. 516,537 (1997).
21. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 11, at 246; Ambassador James Jones, Remarks Be-fore the International Gathering of Experts on the Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic
Development of the Americas (OcL 15-16, 1998), in 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 33, 35 (Supp.
1999) (discussing preference among lawyers and investors in Latin America for ADR and
other forms of private decisionmaking over public law processes); Frank C. Shaw, Reconcil-
ing Two Legal Cultures in Privatizations and Large-Scale Capital Projects in Latin America,
30 L. & POL'Y INT'LBuS. 147,156 (Supp. 1999) (same).
22. See Black et al., supra note 11, at 254; Jeffrey Davidow, Remarks Before the Interna-
tional Gathering of Experts on the Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of
the Americas (Oct. 15-16), in 30 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 15,16 (Supp. 1999).
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transactions and thereby facilitate enforcement of the public norms
governing those exchanges.O
These factors necessarily circumscribe the mechanisms available to
public policymakers seeking both to remedy downside facets of pri-
vate order and to facilitate implementation of its beneficial compo-
nents. Accordingly, the design of public institutions in developing
economies should be seen as a distinct project from the design (or re-
design) of such institutions in developed ones. Blind mimicry of
public-law structures utilized in highly developed economies will not
only replicate the problematic features of those systems, but at best
will ignore and more likely exacerbate the unique mix of problems
confronting developing ones. Developing economies should not be
seen simply as developed ones at an earlier stage of evolution.
B. The Need for Public-Order Norm Creation.
The existence of well-developed, operational private norms might
suggest that the goal of public institutions in a developing economy
should be restricted to facilitating implementation of private-order
norms. Limited resources, it might be argued, ought not be wasted on
an attempt to replicate what already exists, particularly given the ex-
tensive literature praising the ability of private-order institutions to
develop norms that are often more efficient than those produced by
the public sector.24 Better to concentrate on mechanisms to aid the
smooth and efficient functioning of the private-order system.
Notwithstanding the facial allure of such a strategy, public-order
institutions in a developing economy should seek not only to facilitate
enforcement of sound and effective private norms, but also to promul-
gate substantive public norms governing primary conduct. Private or-
der's downside is not limited to problems of enforcement. The exter-
nalities produced by anticompetitive or discriminatory practices
cannot be remedied by a public-order institution restricted to the effi-
cient and unreflective enforcement of private-order norms. Where an
unregulated private sector is characterized by such practices, the pub-
lic realm should promulgate corrective public norms, although not
necessarily strictly coercive ones,.' to force private-order institutions
23. See M 4llhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 58; see also Ronald V. Gilson, Value Creation
by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (describing
"transaction cost engineers"); Gray, supra note 6, at 16 (referring to "watchdog institu-
tions"); Mann, supra note 3, at 2267-68 (describing role of "information merchants").
24. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 281-82; Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note
3, at 1803-04; Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 3, at 157; Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law, supra note 3; Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press:
Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REv. 85, 88-89 (1992).
25. See infra Section II.C.
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to internalize the externalities they produce, and to act in ways that
are efficient not only in the short run?6
And even where private-order norms appear productive and effi-
cient in light of current market conditions, public-order institutions
can help curb the potential for private-order inefficiencies in the fu-
ture. Just as private-order systems may arise because of dissatisfaction
with the content of substantive public-order norms,27 the continued
development of considered public-order rules can function to keep a
private-order regime from becoming sluggish. While private norms
often may be more efficient, and indeed preferable to public-order
rules, various factors may cause private norms to lag behind techno-
logical and other changes and thereby regulate private behavior less
than optimally.' The promulgation of public-order norms thereby
should foster an ongoing dialogue between private- and public-order
institutions about the optimal content of substantive norms.
Finally, in specified contexts, public intervention may be appropri-
ate notwithstanding the fact that private-order practices may reflect
rational considerations and yield policies deemed efficient from both
short- and long-term perspectives. In other words, even where private
order may be efficient and flexibly so, it may run counter to funda-
mental principles that a society, upon proper reflection, decides should
not be subject to the calculus of efficiency.
C. Implementation Measures
Public-order institutions should foster implementation of both
well-functioning private norms and the public-order rules that displace
problematic private ones.
First, while some private-order institutions reject wholesale any in-
teraction with public-order institutions,29 carefully targeted action by
public-order institutions can facilitate implementation of robust and
efficient private norms. Elinor Ostrom has explained, for example,
how California provided public institutional facilities needed to im-
plement a program devised by private parties and local governments
to manage underground water storage basins in the Los Angeles met-
26. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 1729-30.
27. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 282-83; Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note
3, at 1770-71; Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 3.
2& See PAUL ALEXANDER, SRI LANKAN FISHERMEN: RURAL CAPITALISM AND
PEASANT SOCIETY 261-62 (1982); Posner, supra note 5, at 1713 (arguing information lag may
contribute to greater efficiency of public-order norms).
29. See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 3, at 1770 (arguing private transactors
may employ state procedures in end-game situations while preferring extra-legal norms in
cooperative relationships they seek to preserve); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 3, at 115;
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 3.
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ropolitan area?0 The state codified the local arrangement as state law;
it opened its courts, subsidized the cost of litigation, and conferred
standing on participants in the program to ease speedy resolution of
disputes; and it provided important technical assistance to assess the
stability and capacity of the underground basins. While the underlying
arrangement was not a purely private one, Ostrom's observations re-
garding the state's role in facilitating sustainable management of this
common pool resource indicate more broadly that the public realm
can provide important institutional facilities to enforce and otherwise
support promising norms produced by private order.
The reliance of certain private-order institutions on externality-
producing enforcement mechanisms further supports the need for ef-
fective public implementation of some private-order norms. Private
actors may rely on vandalism or other forms of physical violence pre-
cisely because the underlying private-order arrangement conflicts with
an established public norm, as, for example, when the underlying ar-
rangement is a loansharking contract. In this context, the public realm
must either accept the violence or commit the resources necessary to
curtail the underlying substantive private norm; simply providing an
alternative mechanism to enforce the private norm will not suffice.
Elsewhere, however, private-order norms may fully comport with
public-order principles; the private norms designed to restrain overuse
of a communal resource often provide such an example. Here the
problem is not the underlying private norm, but the reliance of
private-order institutions on unaccountable forms of self-help, in-
cluding vandalism and other acts of physical violence, to enforce the
norm. 1 And while private order's ability to employ such measures
may explain the efficacy of some private-order systems, public institu-
tions, at least in theory, can offer an alternative remedy 2
Second, where public-order institutions seek not to implement or
improve the implementation of private norms, but instead to modify
or supplant a substantive private-order norm that thwarts public con-
cerns for efficiency and fairness,33 they should be wary of employing
purely coercive measures. Such measures can, at times, advance pub-
lic policy aims,' but they often impose sizeable costs, both to the pub-
30. See OSTROM, supra note 7, at 133.
31. See, e.g., ACHESON, supra note 6, at 73-76; ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 215-19;
OSTROM, supra note 7, at 15-19; see also MILLER, supra note 10, at 77-109.
32. In this regard, the public realm's role mirrors that played by some private entities
when public-order norms emerge without accompanying complementary enforcement
mechanisms. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 58-60 (describing public-order enforce-
ment gap).
33. Identification of such norms is not necessarily an easy task. See Posner, supra note
5, at 1726-27.
34. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous
Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. Rnv. 103,107 (1998).
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lic sector and to the private-order entities subject to them, and they
are likely to engender counterproductive resistance by the regulated
community.35 Public institutions themselves may lack the ability and
resources to enforce them fairly and effectively 6
A more promising strategy may be to encourage private-order im-
plementation of the public norm.37 Various mechanisms exist to ac-
complish this, including technology-forcing laws that instruct desig-
nated private industries to internalize the externalities they produce-"
market-based incentive structures;3 9 and rules that encourage private
self-regulation.1 To varying degrees, a credible threat of wholly pub-
lic enforcement mechanisms must generally lie behind these ap-
proaches.41
Finally, when public procedures are employed to implement public
norms, those procedures must be tailored to accommodate the power
and resources of the public institutions that will oversee them. In de-
veloping economies marked by the difficulties discussed earlier, this
35. See, e.g., PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming En-
vironmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environ.
men4 and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 1 (1985).
36. See, e.g., Braguinsky, supra note 5, at 517; Gray, supra note 6, at 14.
37. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
1008-14 (1995); Posner, supra note 5, at 1729-32; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 923.
38. See, e.g., Christina S. Chen, Persistent Organic Pollutants: Regime Formation and
Norm Selection, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 119, 126-31 (1998) (discussing examples such as trad-
able emission rights, eco-labels, emissions taxes, aggregate national caps, and benchmark
standards); Richard W. Parker, Choosing Norms to Promote Compliance and Effectiveness:
The Case for International Environmental Benchmark Standards, in INTERNATIONAL
COMPLIANCE wrTH NONBINDING ACCORDS 145,148 (Studies in Transnational Legal Policy
No. 29,1997); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,
113 HARV. L REV. 501, 518-19 (1999) (discussing the V-chip and congressional technology-
forcing responses to digital telephones and digital audio technology); Richard E. Wiley, De-
velopments in Communications Law: Competition, Consolidation, and Convergence, in 17TH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS: POLICY & REGULATION 155, 214 (PLI
Intellectual Property Course Handbook Series No. G-584,1999) (discussing V-chip).
39. See Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Para-
digm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585,591-95 (1996).
40. For example, the relatively new Russian corporate law seeks to increase opportuni-
ties for significant minority shareholders to protect their interests against self-dealing com-
pany insiders, notwithstanding weak procedures for public judicial oversight. The law in-
creases the number of decisions that require shareholder approval, authorizes supermajority
voting requirements, and restricts certain decisions to disinterested directors. See Black et
al., supra note 11, at 248-51.
41. Effective implementation of public norms also requires the participation of the
"rights-enforcement agents" that Milhaupt and West describe. Lawyers, accountants, in-
vestment bankers, credit rating agencies, and even the press acquire and share information
and monitor behavior by both private and public actors. In developing economies where too
few of these agents operate, public-order institutions should facilitate growth of this class
through financial incentives, job training, and the removal of state-imposed or otherwise ar-
tificial barriers to entry. See Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 58-60; see also Gray, supra
note 6, at 16.
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means that the public realm may be required to adopt procedures that
sacrifice flexibility for clarity and that limit the discretion exercised by
public decisionmakers.42 Even the rigidity and formality of the English
writ system might provide a model approach. Notwithstanding the ex-
tensive criticism lodged against it, the writ system offered a fixed pro-
cess and standardized remedies that largely removed discretionary
power from the primary decisionmaker's role.43 To be sure, rules that
sacrifice flexibility for clarity may fail to do justice in an individual
case. But a developing economy may well find that such a cost must
be incurred until the systematic deficiencies that mark emerging public
institutions are mitigated or ideally eliminated. At that time, more
nuanced, albeit less clear rules, the ones Carol Rose terms "muddy,"
can emerge. 4
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF PUBLIC ORDER
Private order is not, as McMillan and Woodruff appropriately con-
clude, a substitute for public order. The public realm performs, or at
least should perform, an important function in both developing and
developed economies by correcting problematic features of otherwise
well-functioning private-order systems, and by facilitating the smooth
implementation of effective private-order norms. It is not, however,
solely these functions that warrant state involvement when a system of
private order operates. The process of democratic deliberation, with
its accompanying norms of transparency, predictability, and account-
ability, offers the promise of more reflective and inclusive governance
than can even the most efficient private-order institution.
Private-order systems are, by definition, private, and accordingly
do not and need not embody "the legal norms and political consensus
on which state order is based." 5 Indeed, it is their freedom from these
constraints that yields much of private order's effectiveness and pro-
ductivity. Private-order institutions may choose to hear from non-
members prior to adopting a policy or practice, but they need not do
so. Likewise, private-order decisionmakers can, but need not, employ
the rules that govern in public judicial proceedings; indeed, their abil-
42. See, e.g., James Spinner, Remarks Before the International Gathering of Experts on
the Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of the Americas (Oct. 15-16,
1998), in 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 47,49 (Supp. 1999).
43. See, e.g., F. MArn.AND, EQurrY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 295-375 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1909); T-EODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 271-84 (5th ed. Little, Brown & Co., 1956) (1929); MARTIN
SHAPIRO, COURTS 80-82 (1981).
44. Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 582-83
(1988). See also Black et al., supra note 11, at 251 (expressing preference for bright-line
rules where emerging public institutions are weak).
45. Milhaupt & West, supra note 5, at 92.
August 2000] 2491
Michigan Law Review
ity to consult evidence that would be inadmissible in public-
adjudicatory processes arguably enables them to produce more tai-
lored decisions than can public institutions.46 Participants in private-
order institutions benefit in both the short and long term from these
techniques.
Democratic public-order decisionmaking, by contrast, requires
compliance with established procedural norms, including public proc-
esses in which all affected individuals and groups are or at least should
be able to participate.47 The resulting process may well be unwieldy
and the ultimate policy choice may itself yield inefficiencies. But these
sacrifices find justification in the value produced by public participa-
tion itself. That participation both confers public legitimacy on the
substantive decisions reached, regardless of their content, and fosters
public acceptance of, if not agreement with, policy choices that are
implemented. As important, the act of participation itself, wholly in-
dependent of the outcome produced, holds value as a mechanism to
create and develop identity and community. As Frank Michelman has
explained: "Through political engagement, persons or communities
(or both, reciprocally) forge identities, and persons assume freedom in
the 'positive' sense of social and moral agency. The value of the en-
gagement is thus understood as inseparable from the self-constitutive
value of identity and freedom."'
The particular substantive policies that result from public partici-
pation in their creation provide a further basis to prefer public-order
decisionmaking to private. Unlike private-order norms, public rules
produced through the process of democratic deliberation should em-
body a conception of the common public good, as opposed to purely
private preference. 49 To be sure, public decisions often fall short of
this aspiration, and a sizeable literature suggests that they will invaria-
bly fall short.50 But even if the public-regarding character of public
46. See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 1, at 2425; see also Bernstein, Opting Out,
supra note 3, at 126-27; Charny, supra note 3, at 415.
47. Cf. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
286-89 (1962) (describing influence of special interest groups on public decisionmakers);
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-26 (1985) (de-
scribing the advantages "discrete and insular" groups have in forming well-organized lob-
bies).
48. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argu-
ment Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443,451 (1989).
49. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1691 (1984); see also GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
58 (1972); Michelman, supra note 48, at 445.
50. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed.
1963); ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 31-54 (1982); WILLIAM
H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM (1982); Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott,
Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 571-81,572 n.13 (1977). But see
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990).
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policy is more aspirational than descriptive, that aspiration and a
commitment to strive toward achieving it distinguish the public from
the private realm and provide a basis to prefer the former over the lat-
ter. Private order is private preference, with no pretense that it de-
fines or pursues a common good. And while those truly pessimistic
about public order's ability to avoid capture and factional control
might prefer private order for the transparency of its goals, a system
that offers the promise and at times the reality of transcending indi-
vidual self-interest in order to define and promote a common public
good ought to be the object of our aspirations. Here, we should reject
the notion that the best is the enemy of the good, and instead strive for
the first-best solution, because it can be the only source of public le-
gitimacy in a democratic society. In other words, the democratic po-
litical process should not be understood "as simply another sort of
market.""'
This does not mean that public-order institutions should aim to
supplant the system of private order in whole or even in part. The
scholarship on private order has demonstrated how, in many circum-
stances, private norms yield benefits that the public realm cannot ef-
fectively produce.52 Democratic public-order institutions are never-
theless needed to confer public legitimacy on well-functioning private-
order norms. Particularly in developing economies where a vacuum in
public order spurs the creation of private-order norms to structure
transactions, public institutions should be developed to assess those
norms, even if the process of democratic deliberation yields nothing
more than acquiescence to or ratification of the extant system of pri-
vate order. Such deliberation certifies the fairness and public accep-
tance of the private system and thereby confers public legitimacy that
the private-order system would otherwise lack in a democratic soci-
ety.5 3
Democratic public institutions thus are critical, and in this sense
foundational, even where private order appears to function smoothly
and efficiently. Their role is limited neither to repairing cracks in pri-
vate order nor to fillings gaps in that regulatory system. Instead, an
inclusive, transparent, and democratic public sphere ultimately pro-
vides the authoritative forum for deliberation about norms of govern-
ance. It provides the starting and ending point for public legitimacy,
and thus the foundation of legitimacy for private order as well.
51. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1693.
52. See supra notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text.
53. Cf Sunstein, supra note 5, at 958-59, 964.
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